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Throughout his adult life Samuel L. Clemens was actively engaged in all dimensions of
intellectual property.  Though he was the first writer to incorporate and register his pseudonym
as a trademark, and copyrights on his best selling books yielded a steady flow of income, his
single most profitable property right was to a self-pasting scrapbook he patented in 1873.  Some
of his greatest disappointments, however, also stemmed from troubles with the intellectual
property system, including unsuccessful litigation over piracy of his works and investments in
patented technologies which turned sour and contributed to his bankruptcy. Despite his decidedly
mixed experience, Clemens remained an ardent believer in systems of intellectual property.
Speaking through the Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, he declared: “…the very first
official thing I did, in my administration – and it was on the very first day of it too - was to start a
patent office; for I knew that a country without a patent office and good patent laws was just a
crab, and couldn’t travel any way but sideways or backways.”
Clemens was far from alone among nineteenth-century observers in his view that the
U.S. patent system was a significant factor behind the rapid technological progress and great
prosperity that the nation enjoyed.   The United States dazzled the world with its ingenuity at the
Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851.  Receiving much comment were the wide range of industries
to which American inventors had made technological contributions, the extraordinary creativity
displayed in lowering the costs of producing standardized goods, and the broad spectrum of the
population involved in inventive activity.  Many suggested that its rather distinctive, if not
revolutionary, patent laws were especially favorable to invention, and it was no coincidence that
Britain, after nearly a quarter century of study by a series of parliamentary committees, approved
a major overhaul of its patent system in 1852 to make it more like that of its competitor across
the Atlantic.  Although opinion remained divided, most countries -- helped along by a series of
international conferences that were  organized to encourage convergence in treatment of
intellectual property -- moved in the same direction by the end of the century.
Then, as now, many questions were raised about the design of systems of intellectual
property.  At a general level, there were some who doubted the net benefits of awarding property
rights in technology at all; indeed, during the so-called patent controversy of the mid-nineteenth
century, the Netherlands and Switzerland did away with their patent systems for extended
periods.  Others, such as those who rationalized the much higher fees and other costs of obtaining
a patent that prevailed for most of the century in Britain and much of Europe, argued for limiting
grants to inventions that were of major consequence or had required extraordinary talents and
resources to discover.  Similar sentiments were expressed even in the U.S., where organized
groups representing railway companies and farmers lobbied heavily for changes in the law that
would have made it more difficult to enforce patents pertaining to inventions that were deemed
straightforward incremental extensions of existing technology or  “in the air”.  While Congress
was consumed with extended and controversial deliberations about the reforms needed, the
Supreme Court took the initiative in the late 1870s and early 1880s that narrowed the enforceable
breadth of patents.  Finally, there was much discussion of whether and how systems of
intellectual property should vary over time, technology, or stage of development, as well as of the
returns to harmonizing them across countries.  Ironically, the U.S., which became a force behind
the movement toward coordinating patent systems, had been something of an intellectual
plunderer in the realm of copyrighted material for most of the century and only agreed to modify
its laws to allow foreign residents copyrights in 1891.
EARLY HISTORY
The intellectual property clause providing for the patent and copyright systems appears
in the very first Article of the U.S. Constitution, whereby Congress was instructed to “promote
the progress of science and useful arts by securing to authors and inventors the rights to their
respective writings and discoveries”. American policymakers did not start with a blank slate.3
The grant of exclusive property rights vested in patents had a long history, tracing back to
medieval guild practices in Europe.  British monarchs had frequently used patents to raise
revenue through the sale of, or to reward favorites with, privileges such as monopolies over trade
in specified commodities.  In 1624 the Statute of Monopolies repealed the practice of royal
monopoly grants to all except inventors, but the British patent system retained many features that
reflected its origins in royal privilege well into the nineteenth century.  Patent rights were
regarded as a favor from the Crown, and applications had to win approval from a number of
different officials before the monarch signed off through a process that was anything but
transparent.  In addition to the high transactions costs associated with navigating the labyrinth of
the patent review process, extremely high fees were also assessed.  Other salient features of the
British system were the restriction of access to the specifications of patents until they expired,
and a relative lack of attention as to whether the patentee was actually the inventor or an
innovator.  Britain, like most other nations in Europe, frequently awarded patents to residents
who were importing technologies discovered elsewhere.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution and of its early laws were familiar with British
precedents, and so it might reasonably be inferred that their innovations in the design of the
patent system were self-conscious and deliberate.  From what record of their thinking survives,
they were intent on crafting a new type of system that would be focused on promoting
technological and commercial development and also serve as a repository of information on prior
art.  Indeed, it can be argued that the result of their efforts was the world's first modern patent
institution.  One goal was broad access to property rights in technology, which was achieved
through low fees (approximately 5 percent of what they were in Britain) and an application
process that was impersonal and relied on routine administrative procedures. Incentives for
generating new technological knowledge were also fine-tuned by requiring that the patentee be
“the first and true inventor” anywhere in the world, and that the specifications of the invention be
made available to the public immediately on the issuance of the patent.  This latter condition not
only sped the diffusion of technological knowledge, but also -- when coupled with strict
enforcement of patent rights -- aided in the commercialization of the technology itself.
The American legal system reinforced the effectiveness of the patent system. Within a
few decades the judiciary evolved rules and procedures to enforce the rights of “meritorious
patentees” (whose novel creations added to the stock of social capital ) and their assignees, as
opposed to monopolists (who took from the public for their private gain). Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story, the acknowledged intellectual property expert of the early courts, made the
perspective clear in Lowell v. Lewis (1817): “the inventor has a property in his invention; a
property which is often of very great value, and of which the law intended to give him the
absolute enjoyment and possession ... involving some of the dearest and most valuable rights
which society acknowledges, and the constitution itself means to favor.” Congress was also
flexible in adapting the law to improve the system, most notably with the Patent Act of 1836
which introduced the examination system that is still in use today.  The previous registration
system, modeled on British practices, had left issues of novelty and of validity or appropriate
scope in patent applications to be resolved through civil actions, which soon proved to be an
inefficient way of resolving competing claims. Beginning on July 4
th, 1836, each application was
scrutinized by technically trained examiners to ensure that the invention conformed to the law,
and constituted an original advance in the state of the art.  The change led to a substantial
increase in the potential returns facing individuals contemplating investments in inventive
activity.  Particularly important was the impetus that the strengthening of the property right
entailed in a patent grant gave to the evolution of organized trade in patented technologies.
Copyrights, or legal protection of literary products, had been introduced in fifteenth
century Venice, after the invention of the printing press made it possible to cheaply duplicate
literary and artistic works.   In England, similar privileges or monopoly rights in the book trade4
were granted to printers’ cartels until the passage of the world’s first copyright act, the Statute of
Anne, in 1710.  The first U.S. copyright statute was approved on May 31 1790,  “for the
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”   Authors (broadly defined) were
able to obtain copyright protection by registering their works, complying with deposit and
notification rules, and paying a nominal fee.  Registration initially secured the right to print,
publish and sell maps, charts and books for a period of fourteen years, with the possibility of an
extension for another term.    However, copyrightable subject matter expanded significantly over
the course of the nineteenth century to include musical compositions, plays, engravings,
sculpture, and photographs.   In 1853 Harriet Beecher Stowe was held not to possess the rights to
translations of her own novel, but by 1910 the original copyright holder was granted the right to
translate literary works into other languages; performance rights; and the rights to arrange and
adapt musical works, among others.  Congress also lengthened the term of copyright several
times.
The U.S. was long a net importer of literary and artistic works, especially from England,
which implied that recognition of foreign copyrights would have led to a net deficit in
international royalty payments.  Despite the lobbying of numerous authors and celebrities on
both sides of the Atlantic, the American copyright statutes did not allow for copyright protection
of foreign works for fully one century.  As a result, the nineteenth century offers a colorful
episode in the annals of intellectual property, as American publishers and producers freely
pirated foreign literature, art, and drama. The publishing industry was further protected by tariffs
on books that ranged as high as 25 per cent.  Other countries retaliated and refused to grant
American authors copyright protection.  As a result of lack of legal copyrights in foreign works,
the publishing industry experienced several decades of intense, if not quite “ruinous”
competition.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the industry achieved relative
stability by tacitly colluding to create and recognize synthetic property rights in foreign-authored
books. These exclusive rights were tradable, and were enforced by threats of predatory pricing
and retaliation.  Thus, these practices suggest that legally enforceable property rights were of
sufficient importance to publishers that, in their absence, the companies attempted to simulate
their effects, albeit at higher costs.
In the case of patents, the rights of inventors, whether domestic or foreign, were widely
viewed as coincident with public welfare.  In stark contrast, policymakers showed from the very
beginning an acute sensitivity to trade-offs between the rights of authors and social rights or
welfare. The protections provided to authors under copyrights were as a result much more
limited than those provided by the laws in many European countries based on moral rights. Of
relevance here are stipulations regarding first sale, work for hire, and fair use.   Under a moral
rights-based system, an artist or his heirs can claim remedies if subsequent owners alter or distort
the work in a way that allegedly injures the artist’s honor or reputation.  According to the first
sale doctrine, the copyright holder lost all rights after the work is sold.  If the copyright holder’s
welfare would be enhanced by nonmonetary concerns, these individualized concerns could be
addressed and enforced through contract law, rather than through a generic federal statutory
clause that would affect all property holders.  Similarly, work for hire doctrines also repudiated
the right of personality, in favor of facilitating market transactions.   For example, in 1895
Thomas Donaldson filed a complaint that Carroll D. Wright’s editing of Donaldson’s report for
the Census Bureau was “damaging and injurious to the plaintiff, and to his reputation” as a
scholar.  The court rejected his claim and ruled that as a paid employee he had no rights in the
bulletin; to rule otherwise would create problems in situations where employees were hired to
prepare data and statistics.
This difficult quest for balance between private and public good is most evident in the
copyright doctrine of “fair use” that (unlike with patents) allowed unauthorized access to5
copyrighted works under certain conditions.   Joseph Story ruled in Folsom v. Marsh (1841): “we
must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”  One of
the striking features of the fair use doctrine is the extent to which property rights were defined in
terms of market valuations, or the impact on sales and profits, as opposed to a clear holding of
the exclusivity of property.  Fair use doctrine thus illustrates the extent to which policy makers
weighed the costs and benefits of private property rights.   If copyrights were as strictly
construed as patents, it would serve to reduce scholarship, prohibit public access for
noncommercial purposes, increase transactions costs for potential users, and inhibit learning
which the statutes were meant to promote.
  The copyright system changed continually throughout the nineteenth century to
encompass improvements in technology and changes in the marketplace. New technologies
raised copyright questions because they became potential subjects for copyright protection, and
because many new technologies in the 19th century, such as photography and lithography,
enabled and lowered the costs of infringement of copyrighted works.   In Edison v. Lubin (1903),
the lower court rejected Edison’s copyright of moving pictures under the statutory category of
photographs.  This decision was overturned by the appellate court: “[Congress] must have
recognized there would be change and advance in making photographs, just as there has been in
making books, printing chromos, and other subjects of copyright protection.”  Many
uncopyrightable innovations such as stock market quotations and ticker tape news reports were
protected through alternative doctrines, such as unfair competition, in order to further market
transactions.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENTING AND PATENT INSTITUTIONS  Encouraged by
the low costs of filing and the relatively rapid development of mechanisms for enforcement,
Americans were from the outset enthusiastic about establishing their claims to intellectual
property. By 1810 the U.S. far surpassed Britain in patenting per capita.  Patenting exhibited a
strongly pro-cyclical pattern throughout the nineteenth century, with the salient exception being
the sharp acceleration that occurred during the years just preceding the War of 1812, when the
Embargo of 1807 and other barriers dramatically reduced the volume of foreign trade. Such
developments would normally be expected to have triggered an economic contraction in the
young country which exported agricultural goods and natural resources, but the stimuli to
inventive activity provided by the cut off of supplies of manufactures from abroad and the spread
of the population westward, along with the associated investments in manufacturing plant and in
the transportation infrastructure, may have been sufficient to offset the effects of an aggregate
downturn.  Patenting rates stagnated during the War of 1812 and the severe worldwide
contraction that followed, but resumed their rapid rise early in the 1820s.  Except for the sharp
drop in the number of patents granted when the examination system replaced the registration
system in 1836, and dips during general economic downturns and the Civil War, the trend was
steadily upward until peaking in the mid-1880s.  The growth in patenting was especially dramatic
from the 1840s through the 1870s when the per capita rate increased fifteen times.
Scholars have followed the path blazed by Jacob Schmookler and Zvi Griliches in
employing patent records to study the sources and patterns of inventive activity over this crucial
period when the U.S. emerged as a world leader in technology and an industrial power.  One of
the principal implications of their work to date has been that inventors were quite sensitive to so-
called demand-side factors. They have created proxies for market access by exploiting the large
differences between the costs of transporting goods by water and by land prior to the railroad,
and demonstrated that patenting rates varied substantially across geographic areas with access to
markets, even after controlling for local industrial composition and degree of urbanization.6
Moreover, close examination of what happened in the vicinity of discrete transport projects, such
as the Erie Canal, whose routes were chosen through processes exogenous to the state of
economic development suggests that rates of patenting rose steeply within a few years of
opening.  Similar patterns have been noted in early industrial Britain.  This close relationship
between access to markets and patenting is certainly consistent with the view that inventive
activity was responsive to material incentives, as well as to the availability and security of
property rights in technology.
Many questions have been raised about whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain the
hypotheses that the rate of invention was indeed higher because the expansion of markets had
increased the returns to new technologies or because the existence of a well-functioning patent
system helped inventors to appropriate some of those returns.  Although there remains room for
skepticism, these ideas have survived a number of stringent tests of consistency with the record.
For example, critics have argued that patent counts are flawed by the inability to distinguish
between important and trivial inventions.  In order to evaluate the relevance of this problem,
systematic data on the efforts of 160 early-nineteenth-century ‘great inventors’ (whose inventions
were presumably more valuable on average than those of all inventors) were collected and
analyzed.  Virtually all of these ‘great inventors’ made use of the patent system to appropriate the
returns to their efforts.  Moreover, their patenting   exhibited remarkably similar cyclical patterns
to that of ordinary patentees, and their activity was even more concentrated in geographic areas
with low-cost access to markets.  Such locations must have been particularly attractive to
technologically-creative individuals seeking to extract the returns to their talents, and part of the
high patenting by ‘great inventors’ in these locations was due to in-migration.  However, since
the ‘great inventors’ were disproportionately born in the same areas, the extent of markets does
seem to have had real independent effects on the rates of inventive activity.  Overall, the strong
association of patenting with the market in the case of both ordinary patentees and (even more)
‘great inventors’ supports the notion that potential returns played a major role in the processes
generating inventions -- big and small.
As the extent of the market for technology expanded over the course of the nineteenth
century, creative individuals with a comparative advantage in technology appear to have moved
increasingly toward specializing in inventive activity.  This tendency was likely reinforced by the
increasing importance to inventors of specialized technical knowledge as technology became
more complex.  The dramatic increase in specialization took place at two levels.  First, among
individuals, there was a substantial rise in the proportion of all patents that were awarded to
inventors who were specialized or very productive at invention over their careers.  From the first
third of the nineteenth century to the last third, the fraction of cross-sections of patents that went
to inventors who received 10 or more patents over their career jumped from less than 5 percent to
between 25 and 36 percent.  These particularly productive inventors were also distinguished by
high rates of assignment (selling off) or licensing to firms or other individuals. Among the above-
mentioned ‘great inventors’ (whose activity was primarily in the first half of the century),
roughly two-thirds extracted some of the return to their inventions through these means.  Among
a random sample of patentees from the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, patentees
who received 5 or fewer patents over their careers assigned away the rights to less than 20
percent of them.  In contrast, those who received 20 or more patents over their careers sold off
the rights to nearly 60 percent of the patents they received.
 The other way in which specialization increased was across organizations.  The period
of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century has sometimes been referred to as the ‘golden age
of independent inventors’. Although specialization at invention across individuals can occur
within a single firm, and indeed is often a celebrated feature of many large firms with R & D
laboratories, the major changes of the nineteenth century appear to have been realized largely
across enterprises through the operation of a market for technology.  Naomi Lamoreaux and7
Sokoloff have shown that the highly productive patentees of that era were quite entrepreneurial
and typically not employees of the firms to which they assigned their patented inventions.  The
evolution of a market for technology had allowed for a division of labor between individuals or
firms who were relatively specialized at invention, and those who focused on commercial
development. During the last few decades of the nineteenth century, these highly productive
patentees exhibited ‘contractual mobility’, where the patentees assigned different patents to
different assignees.  It was only early in the twentieth century that a trend toward long-term
attachments between highly productive inventors and particular firms became evident.  Even
then, these inventors were more likely to have become principals or officers in the firms to which
they assigned their patents, rather than employees.
What were the origins of this market for technology?  Trade in patented technology
appears to have grown rapidly soon after the introduction of the examination system in 1836
strengthened the property right to the technology covered by a patent.  This development reduced
the transactions costs associated with commerce in technology, and an examination of the
registry of the assignment contracts maintained by the Patent Office (where they had to be
deposited within three months in order to be legally binding) indicates that already by the 1840s
there was a high rate of exchange in patent rights.  At first, much of the trade in patent rights
consisted of geographic-specific assignments, such as an inventor in Massachusetts selling off
the rights to his patent for the state of Missouri and for the state of Illinois to firms in St. Louis
and Chicago respectively.  In a context in which high transportation costs meant that output
markets were regionally segmented, such geographic assignments were an effective way for an
inventor to appropriate more of the return to his investment in inventive activity – for it
augmented the return he could realize through direct commercial application in his hometown.
But as transportation costs fell and a national market developed, sales of patent rights were
carried out for the entire country.
Institutional support for trade in patented technologies came from many sources.  Most
fundamental were the practices of the U.S. Patent Office in promoting knowledge of new
inventions.  Early in the nineteenth century it began to regularly publish descriptions of patents
granted, and maintained offices throughout the country where models of recently patented
inventions could be displayed and examined.  Public knowledge of new patents and
developments in technology was further stimulated when growing legions of patent agents or
lawyers materialized soon after the 1836 law, especially in major cities and other localities where
rates of patenting were high.  Although these agents were focused initially on helping inventors
obtain patents under the new system, it was not long before they assumed a major role in the
marketing of patented inventions.  Many    national patent agencies were formed, and they
typically published periodicals with the latest news about patents and technology (including
extensive sections of classified advertisements encompassing all types of participants in a
general market on technology)  that attracted large readerships and helped popularize invention
as a path for the entrepreneurially minded.  Munn and Company, for example, began publishing
Scientific American in 1846 as just such a newspaper and maintained offices across the country.
Over time, intermediation in this market for technology grew ever more articulated in a process
not unlike the evolution of financial intermediaries, as patent agents and lawyers became
increasingly specialized and  drawn into activities such as the provision of advice to inventors
about the prospects for various lines of inventive activity, and the matching not only of buyers
with sellers of patents but also of inventors with individuals seeking to invest in the development
of new technologies.
Near the end of the century, patenting on a per capita basis began a long secular decline,
which has only recently shown signs of reversing.  This protracted decrease in patenting rates has
attracted much attention from scholars of technology, and undoubtedly had diverse sources.  Yet,
it is intriguing to consider whether this marked shift in the patenting rate may have been related8
to the equally dramatic change in the organization of inventive activity that started to emerge at
about the same time.  In particular, the most productive inventors of the late-nineteenth century
were quite entrepreneurial and independent of the firms that commercially exploited their
discoveries, but early in the 1900s long-term attachments between them and their assignees, as
well as the formation of research laboratories within large-scale businesses organizations,
became more prevalent.
What factors accounted for the decrease in patenting, especially by independent
inventors?  One possibility is that the growing complexity and capital intensity of technology
raised the cost of carrying out programs of research and development.  In the absence of
developed sources of  venture capital,  these increased costs may have reduced the aggregate
amount of  inventive activity and led to its concentration in large firms with an advantage in
mobilizing capital.  Changes in the law may also have been important, as a series of rulings
across a broad front led to a narrowing of the scope of  patents and a strengthening of the ability
of firms to protect trade secrets, enforce restrictive convenants, and  obtain the rights to patents
awarded to employees.  This evolution of legal thinking about the allocation of intellectual
property rights was likely encouraged by a growing appreciation of the amount of investments
required to support inventive activity, as well as by the relative political influence of parties with
material interests.  Whatever the basis for, or significance of, these changes in doctrine, the
qualitative impact would have been to diminish the relative importance of patenting as a means
of extracting the return to inventive activity.  Instead, firms increasingly relied on other means of
appropriating returns, such as trade secrecy or accelerated product development.
Another important development in the intellectual property rights regime over the  late-
nineteenth century was the movement to attain more uniformity across countries.  Part of the
impetus came from the costs of discordant national rules becoming more burdensome as the
volume of trade in industrial products grew over time. The first international patent convention
was held in Austria in 1873, at the suggestion of the United States, and was followed by other
agreements including the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1884.
The efforts of the United States were hampered by a lack of leverage:  it was unable (or
unwilling) to offer foreign delegations any concessions in exchange for reforms that the latter
agreed to adopt, since American policy was already the world’s most liberal in granting equal
rights to foreign patentees.  Nevertheless, since its patent system was recognized as the most
successful, it is not surprising that patent harmonization implied convergence towards the U.S.
model.
The goal of complete uniformity was not practicable, given the different objectives,
ideologies and economic circumstances of participants.   For instance, as a protectionist measure,
many countries insisted on retaining working requirements or compulsory licenses, despite
strong U.S. opposition to these constraints on the rights of patentees. Countries such as Germany
were initially averse to extending equal protection to foreigners because they feared that their
domestic industry would be overwhelmed by American patents.  The U.S. pressed for the
adoption of reciprocity (which would ensure that American patentees were treated as favorably
abroad as in the United States) but this principle was rejected in favor of  “national treatment”
(American patentees were to be granted the same rights as nationals of the foreign country).  An
important aspect of international patent cooperation at the beginning of the twentieth century was
the adoption of the right of priority, which meant that a patent grant in one country was
recognized in other member countries in which the invention was patentable, and was the first
step towards a global patent grant.
In view of the strong protections of inventors under the U.S. patent system, its copyright
policies appeared to be all the more reprehensible to foreign observers.  The term of copyright
grants throughout the history of the system was generally shorter, and rights in general more
abridged, than in the rest of the world.  Other countries had long recognized the rights of foreign9
authors in national laws and bilateral treaties.   For instance, France allowed copyrights to
foreigners conditioned on manufacturing clauses in 1810, granted foreign and domestic authors
equal rights in 1852, and led the movement for international harmonization of copyrights.  In
marked contrast to its leadership in patent conventions, the United States declined an invitation
to a pivotal conference in Berne in 1883, and did not sign the 1886 agreement of the Berne
Convention which accorded national treatment to copyright holders.  It was not until 1891, when
the balance of trade in literary and artistic works was swinging in its favor, that the U.S.
reformed its international copyright laws.   Even then, the Chace Act included concessions to
printers’ unions (such as requirements that copyrighted books had to be printed in the U.S. or
type set with U.S. plates) which led to the U.S. failure to comply with the terms of the Berne
Convention until 1988.
CONCLUSIONS
Whether through wisdom, ideology, or good fortune, the framers of the U.S. patent
system fashioned a structure that has had a powerful impact on the patterns of inventive activity
and generally worked well.  According to Abraham Lincoln – himself a patentee – the system
“added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”  Its attention to the provision of broad access to,
and strict enforcement of,  property rights in new inventions, coupled with the requirement of
public disclosure, was extremely effective at stimulating the growth of a market for technology
and promoting technical change.   Not that the institution was static.  On the contrary, the patent
system was from the very start, and remains, in a state of continual evolution, and has undergone
a number of fundamental modifications.  Much of the change came through the law, either
through formal legislative alterations or judicial initiatives and reinterpretation, but also
important were the continual adjustments in the structure of the market for patented technologies
made by private agents responding to economic opportunities.  Indeed, a good deal of the success
of the U.S. patent system stemmed  from the flexible and constructive responses to changing
circumstances that were facilitated by having a market as a central feature.
Some of the changes to the U.S. system of intellectual property, such as the introduction
of the examination of patent applications or the extensions in the subject matter of copyrights,
implemented what might be thought of as technical improvements.  Others however, such as the
shift of legal thinking (concentrated in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries) in favor
of the rights of employers to inventions generated by employees of inventors, the evolution of the
role of intermediaries, or the extension of  copyrights to foreign nationals, involved adaptations
that seem related to the stage of development.  The implications of the latter cases raise questions
about the desirability of applying the same system to all places at all times despite certain
undoubted benefits of international harmonization.  Skeptics can  draw some support from the
observation that rules of intellectual property -- like all property rights – have often been
sensitive to the distribution of economic and political power. In short, the historical record
suggests that appropriate policies towards intellectual property are not independent of the level
of economic development and overall institutional environment.
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